The Francoist Repression in the Catalan Countries

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Abstract

This article offers an overview of Francoist repression in the Catalan Countries from the outbreak of the Civil War to the first decade after the establishment of the dictatorship. It covers both physical violence and measures such as economic repression, imprisonment, professional purges and the social and moral control to which the population as a whole was subjected. First the type of violence and domination exercised by the insurgents in the territories occupied is briefly examined. Then the author offers an account of the events: she commences in the summer of 1936 in Majorca, the only Catalan-speaking territory to remain in rebel hands, then proceeds to the Lleida region, which was occupied in the spring of 1938, and concludes with the final offensive against Catalonia and Valencia, launched in the winter of that same year. Special stress is laid on the repercussions of the 1939 Law of Political Responsibilities and the meaning attached by the occupiers to the pacification and reconstruction of the conquered territories.

Key words: Francoism, repression, political violence, Civil War, post-war period, economic repression

The widespread attention paid in recent years to the debate over the memory of the Civil War, the Franco dictatorship, and the treatment given to victims of the hostilities and the repression is a sign, above all, that the difficulty of reconciling individual and collective memories still subsists. The controversy, far from being specific to our own country, is reminiscent of the experiences of other countries, such as Germany, Italy and Russia, that suffered dictatorial regimes of their own at some time during the crisis that affected Europe in the first half of the 20th century. Another good example is provided by the ‘paths of memory’ followed by Latin American countries which have emerged from military dictatorships imposed during the second half of the century. Everywhere it has been necessary to draw the slender dividing line between historical and critical knowledge of the past, on the one hand, and diverse memories of that past on the other.

In Catalonia the Fundació Pi i Sunyer, to mention one nearby example, invited several historians and jurists to a symposium in June 2007 on “Violence and justice in Catalonia between 1936 and 1975”. The aim was to stimulate reflection on the meaning of the different forms of violence and repression and the legal and administrative procedures recorded all over Catalonia between the outbreak of the Civil War and the end of dictatorship. As a result, certain brief conclusions – always based on the more intensive and rigorous historical research undertaken from the 1980s onwards – were made public. The idea was to influence the debate on the topic, a debate not devoid of biased, self-interested interpretations, which frequently ignore the fact that all these forms of violence arose out of the military insurrection of July 1936.

Violence and Domination

The victory of the democratic Left in the election held in February 1936, at a time when the rising tide of Fascism in its various forms was reaching its climax, confirmed civil society’s preference for a progressive Republic. A few months later, part of the army rose against the Republic. Furthermore, in those places where the coup failed – as occurred in the greater part of the Catalan Countries – a parallel revolutionary movement broke out which, in the early stages, the Republican authorities were unable to control. These spontaneous outbreaks of violence initially received a boost from repressive acts committed by military authorities from various groups and political organizations acting under instructions that can in no way be attributed to the Republican government. Once the government had
the door was open to the proliferation of special jurisdictions, which efficiently backed up the emergency application of summary justice. The proceedings of courts such as the Tribunales de Responsabilidades Políticas (Political Responsibilities Tribunals), the various commissions set up to purge the administration, and the provincial authorities in charge of maintaining public order, are our best sources of information as to the meaning of the Francoist legal system, which afforded protection to the repressive measures that were systematically applied immediately after the July 1936 rising.6

Summer 1936: The Triumph of the Coup in Majorca

On 18 July 1936, the island of Majorca was the only Catalan-speaking area to fall into rebel hands. Despite the lack of culprits who could be accused of violent opposition to the coup, the plan of repression implemented from the very first days precisely matched what the rebels had defined in advance as urgent ‘surgical’ extermination. The title of a book on the history of the Civil War in the village of Porreres − Desfilades de dia, afusellaments de nit (Parades during the day, shootings at night) − accurately reflects how the routine violence that got underway after the victory of the military coup on the island was turned into a daily spectacle.7

recovered from the surprise, it not only publicly condemned the extremism but attempted to halt it and helped those persecuted by the revolutionaries to escape or go into exile.

In contrast, the violence perpetrated by the insurgents at the same period was conceived as a tool for destroying parliamentary democracy, a prior step towards the imposition of a new social order. Those who had risen against the Republic followed the lead of Europe’s growing Fascist movement by internalizing the Civil War as a campaign to defend western civilization against Soviet barbarity. This campaign was based on the defence of order, religion and social harmony, values which had supposedly been endangered by the Republicans, or ‘Reds’, as they were generically termed. The rebels’ corpus of doctrine exalted the use of force and violence. Consequently it was the all-powerful army which took charge of the chastisement of society, an operation baptized by the Church as a ‘crusade’. Those who had rebelled against the legally constituted Republic considered they had been called upon to carry out a historical mission that did not need the legitimating support of society.4

Thus they set out to destroy the legitimate government and the structures that upheld it through the perpetual use of ‘war-time decrees’ and to demobilize and subdue the population by subjecting them to fear and terror.5 From the legal point of view, once a state of war had been declared and the primacy of military power was ratified, the door was open to the proliferation of special jurisdictions, which efficiently backed up the emergency application of summary justice. The proceedings of courts such as the Tribunales de Responsabilidades Políticas (Political Responsibilities Tribunals), the various commissions set up to purge the administration, and the provincial authorities in charge of maintaining public order, are our best sources of information as to the meaning of the Francoist legal system, which afforded protection to the repressive measures that were systematically applied immediately after the July 1936 rising.6

Figure 1. Remains of the barricades erected at the intersection of Carrer Cavallers and Carrer Major when General Franco’s troops entered the city of Lleida. Porta collection - University of Lleida.
Catalonia, Valencia and Minorca remained on the Republican side, but in Majorca hundreds of arbitrary executions took place, while many other people were tried and had their property confiscated, and still others finished up in prisons and concentration camps scattered round the island.

Josep Massot gives us the most vivid account of the situation. He tells how Alberto Bayo, a lieutenant colonel in the Air Force, tried to win back the Balearics for the Republic in August 1936 – not just Majorca, but Eivissa, Formentera and Cabrera as well, where the rebellion had initially been victorious – and relates the sinister wave of repression that was unleashed in response to his landing. This reaction can hardly be described as ‘uncontrolled violence’ since it involved seeking out the leaders of left-wing parties and labour organizations, along with teachers, journalists, professional people and Free Masons, who were unable to leave the island. Some civilians did take part, however, at the head of secret bands of exalted right-wingers – most, but not all of them Falangists – and it was they who identified the persons to be eliminated. These even included Republicans who had originally been released for lack of charges.8

According to eye-witnesses accounts, two days after the military rising some 1,500 suspects had been imprisoned. It is difficult to estimate how many deaths were imputable to the repression that took place between the summer of 1936 and the first quarter of 1937 – the date of the arrival of the Italians headed by ‘Count Rossi’ – because many of the victims were from elsewhere or had no relatives. Not long after the events, Georges Bernanos, in Les Grands Cimetières sous la lune (Paris, 1938), referred to 3,000 dead. Some later considered this an exaggeration, while others believed it fell short of the truth. Current estimates range from a minimum of 1,000 – the number of fully documented executions – to a maximum of 2,000. Only a few hundred were tried by a military court before being killed.9

David Ginard has no hesitation in describing the Balearic archipelago, which had only 300,000 inhabitants, as one of the most severely punished areas in the Catalan Countries or in Spain. It was here, in his view, that the rebels, by the way they dealt with the popular classes of democratic and left-wing ideology, revealed their determination to stamp out any possible upsurge of protest. Neither fear of Bayo’s militia force which was trying to reconquer lost territory, nor the island’s strategic situation or social structure can account for the ruthlessness of their acts. The only explanation for the reprisals that were carried out immediately wherever the coup was successful is to be found in the underlying logic of terror.

**Spring 1938: Lleida and the Segre Front**

When the Aragon front collapsed in the spring of 1938, part of the region around Lleida fell into rebel hands. The victors occupied a stretch of territory running north to south along the Noguera Pallaresa and Segre rivers. For nine months the new front along the banks of these two rivers held. The only weak points were the bridgeheads at Seròs (Segrà), Balaguer and Baronia de Sant Òsime (Noguera), and Tremp (Pallars Jussà). In all these strategic areas, fierce fighting took place and the Republican army failed to force the occupiers to retreat.

At the Balaguer bridgehead, attempts by the Republicans to recapture positions such as Déu hill – nicknamed *El Merengue* (The Meringue) – caused hundreds of casualties. Today the spot has been restored as a memorial site at the instigation of veterans of the contingent due for call-up in 1941, which received particularly severe punishment on this front. These soldiers, who were mobilized at the tender age of eighteen (seventeen in some cases), have been remembered, year after year, by the Associació d’Excombatents de la Quinta del Biberó (Association of ex-combatants of the ‘baby-bottle contingent’). The name comes from an expression coined by Frederica Montseny, then Minister of Health, moved at the sight of these youths – barely more than adolescents – who had been sent to fight after just a few days’ military training.10

Soon the consequences of political repression were added to the numerous military casualties on the Segre front. In the Lleida region – unlike Majorca –, by the time Franco’s troops arrived many of those with political links to the Republic had retreated to the rearguard, while many of those involved in rearguard revolutionary violence had fled. This, however, did nothing to abate the fury of the occupiers, which was vented upon a defenceless, exhausted population, living in a backward region that had been further impoverished by the proximity of the front.

As soon as the troops arrived, arbitrary, systematic violence got underway. Military courts started operation immediately. José María Fontana, a Falangist from Tarragona, bore witness in his memoirs to the consequences of the arrival of Franco’s troops in Lleida: the occupation of Catalonia, he maintained, took place in a fairly level-headed manner, except for what he describes as “the blemish” of Lleida. The euphemism recalls the cost of the occupation, in human terms, which still cannot be accurately assessed today. Various studies by historians such as Josep Mª Solé, Joan Vilarroya, Manel Gimeno, and later Mercè Barallat and Joan Sagüés, report that repression in the Lleida region was indiscriminate and resolute, and was carried out by the military authorities in cooperation with the Falangists and local right-wingers. Dozens of non-combatants were executed merely on the grounds that they were perceived as sympathetic towards the Republican cause.

Certain extremely violent acts were perpetrated against women from the Pallarès region. These are documented by the historian Manel Gimeno and are highly reminiscent of the fate of five nurses from Bayo’s expedition to Majorca, who were captured, brutally raped, and finally shot. The latter episode is better known than those in the moun-
tains of Lleida, possibly because at the time it aroused controversy even among the regime’s supporters, some of whom tried to exculpate their fellow Francoists on the grounds that Republican women deserved little respect.\textsuperscript{11}

In any event, the number of extrajudicial deaths recorded in Majorca and the Lleida region was extremely large, as is pointed out in the chief summary on the topic to appear to date: \textit{Víctimas de la guerra civil} (Temas de Hoy, 1999), edited by Santos Julià. Even so, the figures quoted in the book for the total number of victims caused by repression in each province are constantly being updated. In Lleida, for instance, the historian Mercè Barallat puts the number of persons executed under sentence from a military court at 558, rather than 450 as stated by Solé Sabaté. She also provides evidence of the shooting of 148 Republicans who were never tried by a war tribunal and the deaths of 169 political prisoners, and estimates that hundreds of undocumented deaths occurred, presumably as the result of uncontrolled violence during the initial phase of the occupation, when the cemetery was on the Republican side of the front that divided the city in two.\textsuperscript{12}

If similar variations are found elsewhere, as several local studies containing detailed statistics indicate, the total of 3,385 victims of Francoist repression in Catalonia, which was established nearly twenty years ago and referred to by Francesc Vilanova as the “numerical canon”, must of necessity be revised in an upward direction.
Winter 1938: the Start of the Offensive against the rest of Catalonia and the Valencian Country

At the end of 1938, the front established the previous spring in the provinces of Lleida and Castelló was broken and the occupation of Catalonia and the Valencian Country got underway. By early February 1939, Franco’s troops had reached the French border. The city of Valencia was not to fall until March. During the last weeks before the final defeat, some 15,000 refugees gathered at the port of Alacant to be evacuated. Many were leading Republicans, who were trapped there waiting for ships that were never able to drop anchor. They suffered the same fate as the rest of the multitude who were taken prisoner when the ports were closed.

Some highly arbitrary acts were again recorded in this final phase of the war, notably in the southern regions belonging to the provinces of Tarragona and Lleida, such as Conca de Barberà, Terra Alta and Les Garrigues. As the historian Josep Termes underlines in his last work, Misèria contra pobresa. Els fets de la Fatarella de gener de 1937 (Afers, 2005), these were poor regions where the outbreak of the Civil War had triggered social conflicts that had been brewing for years. Despite this, military tribunals were set up in the regional capitals and certain smaller localities near the front and soon began operation. Later on it was at the military courts (Auditorias de Guerra) in the provincial capitals that the accused, many of them villagers, were sentenced and, if found guilty, executed.

In Barcelona, over 1,600 executions took place in the open air at the Camp de la Bota in the Poble Nou district, an area that was totally transformed by the building of the site for the 2004 Forum of Cultures. Elsewhere in Catalonia people were usually shot against cemetery walls. Consequently the largest mass graves, containing the bodies of dozens of executed Republicans, are to be found in graveyards. Some 500 people were buried in each of the mass graves in the cemeteries of Tarragona and Lleida. From the mid-1940s onwards, at least in Lleida, a few families were given permission to erect crosses. These were nearly always made of wood and could only bear the name of the person they wanted to remember and the date of death. As time went by, further expressions of mourning took place and latterly the number has increased. The families of those executed – those who had descendants – have never stopped visiting the graves. Many, however, are still awaiting the official ‘dignification’ of these spaces of memory. What they want is neither more nor less than the recovery of memory and the right to remembrance.14

In Catalonia half the executions carried out by the Franco regime took place in 1939. Some 1,000 people were put to death in the period from May to July, an average of 10 per day. Though high, this figure falls far short of the one quoted at the time by Count Ciano, Mussolini’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, who claimed that 150 executions a day were taking place in Barcelona in July.15 Nor should these data lead us to overlook the fact that it was the Catalan countryside that suffered most acutely from the repression. In Valencia the repression was most severe in northern regions such as Camp del Túria, Baix Maestrat, Safor, Vall d’Albaida, Ribera Alta and Ribera Baixa, where the Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (National Confederation of Labour – CNT) was present and therefore experiments in collectivization had been conducted. Moreover the harshest phase of the repression, which lasted from the end of the war to 1942 or 1943 elsewhere, continued well into the 1950s in Valencia, until the Partido Comunista de España (Communist Party of Spain – PCE) called a halt in 1951 to the intensive guerrilla activity that had been taking place in the area.

The Agrupación Guerrillera de Levante (Guerrilla Group of Eastern Spain – AGLA) was a well-established force deployed in the mountainous zone that straddles the provinces of Teruel, Cuenca, Valencia and Castelló. In 1947, as Fernanda Romeu recounted some years ago, it
comprised over 2,000 fighting men and women, not counting liaison agents on the plain. It is not easy to give a date for the cessation of guerrilla action but all the studies carried out confirm that the “three years of terror” – in the words of the historian Francisco Moreno – were those from 1947 to 1949. The recent biography of the Communist leader Heribert Quiñones, that of the Catalan resistance fighter Marcel·lí Massana, “a myth of the anarchist guerrilla movement”, and the history of the anarchosyndicalist Ramon Vila, ‘Caracremada’, a prototypical urban guerrilla fighter who was considered “the last Catalan resistance fighter”, all seem to confirm this.16

**War, Post-War Period, and Victims**

Josep Benet, one of the first historians to calculate the cost of the Civil War and the Franco regime in human terms, expressed the view that Catalonia lost around 125,000 inhabitants, counting military casualties, those executed by both sides, and those who went into exile. Today this figure seems very conservative.

Benet’s definition of the victims, despite its broad span – for it includes losses due to the fighting, the two waves of repression, the penalties imposed in the post-war period, and exile – proves fairly operational, since it enables us to break down the figures and grasp the implications of the defeat. Out of a total population of 2,791,292, according to the 1930 census, Catalonia lost approximately 45,000 young people on the front or in hospitals, some 5,000 in bombing raids, 8,500 as a result of rearguard repression, and nearly 4,000 to Francoist repression during and after the war. To these must be added the approximately 2,000 Catalans sent to Spanish and Nazi prisons and concentration camps, deaths due to explosions and accidents caused by abandoned war materials – an estimated 1‰ of the Catalan population –, deaths imputable to disease or starvation, and the loss to society of the 50,000 to 70,000 Catalans who are currently estimated to have fled into permanent exile.

It may be possible to reach more accurate estimates once the data gathered by the Catalan Generalitat since January 2003 as part of the project "Fosses comunes i persones desaparegudes durant la guerra civil i el franquisme" (Mass graves and persons who disappeared during the Civil War and the Franco regime), which are still being compiled, are known. In the approximately 150 mass graves studied so far, some 9,000 persons were buried without identification, most of them soldiers who died on the battlefront. More precise data may also be yielded by the study “El Cost Humà de la Guerra Civil a Catalunya”, when it is completed. This project, originally launched by Josep Benet at the “Centre d’Història Contemporània de Catalunya” (CHCC) – an organization set up in 1984 of which he was the first director –, has now resumed.17

For the Valencian Country it is more difficult to make overall estimates. It has been calculated that 460 people were killed and 648 were wounded in the bombardment of Alacant between November 1936 and December 1938. In the city of Valencia, 825 people are believed to have been killed in bombing raids during the same period. Close to 3,000 are thought to have been wounded in the bombing of the ports of Gandia, Borriana, Sagunt and Dénia, an operation which – as Ismael Saz observes in _Història del país Valencià, corresponent a l’Època Contemporània_ (Edicions 62, 1990) – was motivated, not only by military factors, but economic and psychological considerations as well. Approximately 10,000 Valencians are believed to have gone into permanent exile. The losses in the Catalan Countries as a whole were on such a scale as to be irreparable, as they were throughout Spain: out of a total population of 23,677,895, according to the 1930 census, between 500,000 and 600,000 lost their lives as a result of the war or its aftermath.

Emergency summary justice was the foremost tool of repression. Countless Republicans were tried by war tribunals. They were charged – paradoxically, as has so often been pointed out – with armed rebellion. In 2003, the President of the present-day military court with jurisdiction over Catalonia, Aragon, the Balearic Islands and Navarre – the Tribunal Militar Territorial Tercer – set up a committee composed of representatives of the Spanish Ministry of Defence and the Catalan autonomous government, the Generalitat. Its mandate was to catalogue the records of the proceedings initiated in Catalonia between 1939 and 1988 currently in the possession of the tribunal, which has headquarters at the Gobierno Militar (seat of the Military Governor) in Barcelona. A first data base, for localization purposes, was created out of individual records. It contains approximately 110,000 prosecutions involving some 146,000 persons, since the charges were often against several accused. These are the figures available so far, and they also reveal that over half the trials took place during the early decades of the dictatorship. In the Valencian Country it is calculated that approximately 8,000 prosecutions were brought by war tribunals in the immediate aftermath of the war. Many, as usually happened, were against several people and thus the number of persons charged is higher. Other partial data tell us, for instance, that more than 5,000 people were tried by war tribunal in Tarragona. In terms of the 1936 census, this means that 15.2‰ of the population were affected.18

The number of death sentences passed after the war ended was enormous: 50,000 executions were added to the 100,000 that had taken place all over Spain during the hostilities. In 1939 and 1940, a total of 300,000 prison sentences were also pronounced, and between 370,000 and 500,000 people were interned in one or other of the concentration camps set up under the provisions laid down in the spring of 1937 at the Generalissimo’s headquarters. As many as sixteen camps seem to have been in operation in Catalonia until 1942, in cities including Barcelona, Reus, Figueres, Lleida and Cervera.

Documentation to this effect is provided by the young
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maintained nonetheless and, following the establishment in 1943 of the Servicio de Libertad Vigilada (Conditional Release Service), many paroled prisoners had to report periodically to the authorities. All these measures amounted to an impregnable system of coercion, supported by a wide variety of techniques aimed at investigation, depuration and chastisement.

Political Responsibilities and Economic Repression

Once Franco had been invested with full legislative power and the criminal code had been suspended pending approval of the revised code in 1944, a new legal framework was gradually built up within which special jurisdictions of different types proliferated. The aim of the latter was to complement the exceptional powers of the military tribunals, which remained in force until the Tribunal de Orden Público (Public Order Tribunal) was set up in 1963. Three laws were of special importance: the Ley de Responsabilidades Políticas (Law of Political Responsibilities, 9 February 1939), the Ley de Represión de la Masonería y el Comunismo (Law for the Repression of the Masonry and

Figure 4. A bill of indictment on grounds of political responsibilities against Humbert Torres, a leader of Joventut Republicana (Republican Youth organization) and a former mayor of Lleida.
Communism, 1 March 1940), and the Ley de Seguridad del Estado (Law of State Security, 29 March 1941).

The economic repression carried out under the Law of Political Responsibilities was conceived as a means whereby the assets of the families of those punished could be used to pay for their guilt. This principle began to be regularly enforced in the course of the hostilities. The penalties were also designed to finance the rebuilding of the country, its destruction being attributed to the acts of the defeated. In Catalonia the pattern was the same as in other areas of Spain that had come under Franco’s rule: the depopulation of the vanquished began immediately after the occupation, in the spring of 1938. In occupied areas such as Majorca and Lleida, aside from irregular seizures of property, which also took place, the occupiers set up Comisiones Provinciales de Bienes Incautados (Provincial Commissions of Confiscated Property) to seize the assets of parties, associations and individual opponents of the regime, notably if the latter had died or fled, as was fairly often the case. The documentation available shows that only 25% of those prosecuted had been located before being judged by the special regional tribunals set up under a new law, which took over the functions of the original commissions. It has been calculated that over 25,000 of the 2,791,292 inhabitants of Catalonia listed in the census were prosecuted by the Tribunal of Political Responsibilities. Much still remains to be discovered about the true extent of this tribunal’s activities.

According to data for the whole of Spain, over 300,000 proceedings had been instituted by 1944. Often, as with the war tribunals, there were several accused. Some 125,000 verdicts were brought in between 1939 and 1941, approximately 10,000 in the province of Barcelona. Nearly 4,000 prosecutions were made in Lleida. All in all, 1% of the population was affected, though the consequences were multiplied by the fact that, in practice, the sanctions affected the entire family of the accused.21

Analysis of the law reveals, among other things, numerous violations of the principle of legality: its effects were made retroactive to 1934; deceased persons and minors could be held responsible, as could those who had disappeared or were absent and therefore unable to defend themselves; and the families of the accused inherited their guilt and could incur economic sanctions. Certain additional penalties, such as disqualification for particular offices or professions, or imprescriptible loss of nationality, even violated the Franco regime’s own laws.

The members of these special tribunals were appointed by the government and drawn from the army, the magistracy − purged of hostile elements − and the Falange (Falange Española Tradicionalista y de la JONS). Among the seventeen grounds for prosecution (article 4), one of the most important was previous conviction by a military court, in other words, a prior conviction for the same offence. Owing to the criminal, penal nature of the law, a fine was obligatory, unless the accused was acquitted or a stay of proceedings was granted. Fines ranged from 100 pesetas to the confiscation of all the accused’s assets. The restriction of professional activities and the limitation of freedom of residence could include a ban on exercising particular professions, various forms of banishment or, as mentioned above, loss of nationality. According to Manuel Alvaro Dueñas, the State expected this legislation to bring in 5% of the wealth of each province but in practice it proved impossible to execute the sentences. Thus in September 1941, 85% of the cases had not yet been tried or were awaiting a verdict. Urgent amendments were needed to make the law more effective. This was done in 1942. In 1945 it was repealed, though a Comisión Liqui-dadora de Responsabilidades Políticas (Commission for the Discharge of Political Responsibilities) remained in operation until the 1960s.

The poverty of most of those charged does much to explain the inefficacy of this legislation which, like all repressive measures, had a largely exemplary function. It was just one more element in the travesty of Franco’s justice, the aim of which, in effect, was to instil fear into the population by hunting down and punishing culprits.

Even so, some sizeable fortunes were seized under the law, and it is these that have left the clearest traces in the historiography. As Francesc Vilanova’s thorough analysis

Figure 5. Often the accused were put on trial in groups, as is shown by this indictment for political responsibilities brought in the Lleida region.
revels, prominent members of the Catalan bourgeoisie were investigated and accused of being lukewarm towards the new regime. Not even those who had worked for Franco’s cause escaped. For instance, the politicians Lluís Duran i Ventosa and Felip Rodés – the latter was a former minister of the Crown – were both denounced for their alleged loyalty to the Catalan nationalist cause. Proceedings were also instituted against Agustín Calvet, ‘Gaziel’ – the journalist, editor and editorialist of La Vanguardia under the Second Republic, who was close to the entourage of Franco’s minister Eduardo Aunós – and against his employer Carles Godó. Industrialists who were former members of the Lliga Regionalista (Regionalist League – a conservative Catalan nationalist party), such as the Bertrand Serra family or the Vilardell Pemanyer brothers, were also prosecuted, while Regionalist leaders of the stature of Raimon d’Abadal i Calderó, Ramon d’Abadal i de Vinyals, Joaquim Balcells and Jesús Cambó Torras, a nephew of the politician Francesc Cambó, were investigated on the grounds that they had been too slow in voicing support for the regime.

Inevitably, all politicians associated with the Catalan autonomous government, the Generalitat, appeared before the special Tribunal of Political Responsibilities. The three children of the former Catalan President Francesc Macià were accused “because of who their father was” and despite the fact that their father had died on Christmas Day 1933, outside the limit of retroactivity (1934) specified in the law itself. The brothers of President Lluís Companys were also prosecuted. The youngest of the four, Camil Companys, was sentenced five months after his own tragic death in Montpellier (he committed suicide there on 20 September 1940, shortly after his brother Lluís was handed over by the Gestapo to Franco’s police).

Other distinguished Republican citizens who were prosecuted included Eduard Ragasol, a property-owner from Caldes de Montbui who was the lawyer of Acció Catalana (Catalan Action, another conservative Catalan nationalist party), Joan Lluhi i Vallescà, and two men from Lleida, Josep Mª España i Sirat, a minister of the Generalitat, and Humbert Torres, a former mayor of the city. Charges were also laid against the Hurtado and Pi i Sunyer families and the Rubió i Tuduri brothers. Another eminent citizen, Pere Coromines, saw his house in Sant Pol converted into the headquarters of the Falange, while the newspaper that belonged to the Rahola family of Girona was seized. Two former mayors of Barcelona, Carles Pi i Sunyer and Jaume Aiguader i Miró, were prosecuted, as were the vast majority of the Republicans who had been elected to the municipal councils of Catalonia’s towns and villages, and workers and union leaders from all over the country, though the latter, if they had not already fled the country, were first brought before the war tribunals.

Intellectuals, artists and professional people were not immune from the effects of the legislation. Charges were brought, for instance, against the painters Joaquim Balcells and Joaquim Mir, while Rafael Battestini, a Catalan nationalist doctor from Tarragona, was accused after he had already been shot, as Joan Mª Thomas has pointed out. Of special interest, because of the sentences handed down, are the cases of the architect Josep Lluís Sert and the musician Pau Casals, who was fined one million pesetas in 1940.

**The Institutionalization of the Purge of Professional People**

On 10 February 1939 the Ley de Depuración de Funcionarios Públicos (Law for the Depuración of Public Servants) came into force. It had irreversible consequences on professional people from a wide range of sectors. From this time onwards, civil servants were subject to a law that had been promulgated to guarantee their loyalty and submission. All government employees – from teachers to magistrates, via the lower echelons, such as postmen (exhaustively studied by Juan Carlos Bordes Muñoz in a doctoral thesis defended in 2003 at the Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia [UNED]) or prison employees – had to prove their innocence. When faced with the humiliating experience of publicly renouncing past ideals and conduct, some prepared documents summarizing the evidence for the defence which, in the words of historian Francisco Morente, were “extraordinarily adroit”. He re-
lates, for instance, how a student from the teacher training college in Valencia defended himself against a charge of “Leftism” with “a long and erudite string of quotations from Franco and José Antonio (!)”. His skilful defence won praise from the purge commission itself.

Teachers were persecuted with special ferocity, especially if they were thought to have assimilated liberal and democratic ideals such as those imparted at the Catalan Generalitat’s teacher training college. The research carried out by Francisco Morente, and that of Solomó Marquès, who studied the collective prestige of teachers in exile in Mexico and Venezuela, reveals that one of every six Catalan teachers was permanently banned from the profession, while others were transferred elsewhere or temporarily suspended without pay. The numbers increase even more if we take into account the fifty government-run secondary schools that were handed over to religious orders, who thus recovered their monopoly over secondary education. Over four hundred teachers fled the country, becoming victims of a defeat that was to have an overwhelming impact on education and culture. This has been clearly illustrated by Jaume Claret in a study of academia, a group located at the apex of the broad pyramid of workers who suffered the consequences of the new regime’s policy of exclusion.

In Catalonia at least 135 university professors were purged. Today they are commemorated by a memorial set up in 2001 in the courtyard at the Ciutadella campus of the Universitat Pompeu Fabra. It bears the names of the 122 teaching staff known to have been purged at the time it was erected. Pompeu Fabra, after whom the university is named, had been chairman of the board of trustees of the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, founded in 1933 by the government of the Republic. He himself was purged and indicted on various counts at the end of the war. Another name is that of Pere Bosch i Gimpera, a professor of prehistory who became chancellor of the University of Barcelona (1933) and Catalan minister of justice (1937-1939). He went into exile first in Oxford and then in Colombia before settling in Mexico and refused all invitations to return to Spain. The professor of philosophy Joaquim Xirau i Palau also went into exile with his brother Josep, a professor of criminal law, who was killed in an accident in Mexico in 1946. Other scientists and scholars who were purged included 71 professors of medicine, among them August Pi i Sunyer and Jesús M. Bellido. The memoirs which many of them left behind contain vivid recollections of this repression, which stilled any voice that might have challenged a new form of higher education “...redeemed from Marxism and incorporated into Nationalist Spain”.22

Punishments and Crimes

An article dedicated by Xavier Lacosta to the Francoist repression in Majorca bears the title “Fusilados sin culpa en Mallorca: los inocentes de la guerra civil” (The shooting of the blameless in Majorca: the innocent victims of the Civil War).23 And indeed, as early as the summer of 1938, the tenuous link that always existed between guilt and punishment was apparent in the wave of repression unleashed in Majorca. From the very start, lists of people to be shot, drawn up by civilian supporters of the new regime, became a feature of Franco’s justice. This form of collaboration was especially rife in the countryside, where the effects of the violent repression were most extreme. This is shown by a wide variety of documents relating to charges and proceedings through which the mechanisms underlying the institutionalization of the new order can be perceived. Under this new order, the efficacy of the violence is seen to be inextricably linked to the re-establishment of former networks of political domination and loyalty based on clientelism and caciquism, which the brief period of Republican democracy had not had time to neutralize.

Denunciation, a method exalted from above, was a way of becoming actively involved in the repression, either voluntarily or under duress. The fact that reports from mayors, priests, civil guards and the leaders of the local Falange were a compulsory feature of the proceedings is clear proof of this. The same applied to charges for political responsibilities or those to do with professional purging. These compulsory reports clearly illustrate to what extent, in repressive practice, the judgement preceded the crime. Agreement was reached in advance over the official reports, testimony and statements to be submitted to the appropriate judicial authority and there is no perceptible discrepancy between the different authorities or institutions called upon to express an opinion about the accused. This system, in effect, relied on fear, which was all-pervasive, and on the caution exercised by those who had already joined, or aspired to join, the new power block, as also happened in other European dictatorships where similar methods of repression and social control were used.

Charges brought against members of the lower classes, who lacked individual and material resources and influential friends to appeal to, were the most numerous and also the ones in which the true nature of Francoist legality – predominated by the absence of general norms, arbitrariness and impunity – are most faithfully reflected. This does not mean, however, that eminent personalities were spared. A prime example was the trial of the Catalan President Lluís Companys before the war tribunal.24 Others were the trials of Carles Rahola – studied by Josep Benet –, that of CNT leader Joan Peiró – analysed by Albert Balcels –, and that of the members of the Barcelona Civil Guard – studied by Manuel Risques –. In each case, the proceedings explicitly confirm the aleatory nature of the judicial actions and the absence of the presumption of innocence. Moreover, as we observe the situation that gradually evolved, we are prompted to take account of the repercussions, in a society under surveillance, of other mechanisms of repression and control which, though less
obvious, are equally important when it comes to determining to what extent, and in what way, the country that had just emerged from a destructive war was rebuilt under the dictatorship.

**Pacification and Reconstruction**

Lleida was the first major Catalan city to discover what taking possession of conquered territory meant to the occupiers. General Yagüe’s troops entered the city on 3 April 1938. Two days later, pacification got underway with the first official act: the repeal, by the government in Burgos, of the Catalan Statute of Autonomy. Ten days after the city was occupied, the first civil governor, Lluís G. Ventalló i Vergés, addressed the citizens of Lleida in a proclamation which referred to the “separatist yoke” and “the crime of separatism”, and finished up with “Long live Spanish Lérida!”, preceded by “¡Arriba España!” and followed by “¡Viva el Generalísimo Franco!”. Thus, in the midst of a serious moral and economic crisis, the repression of the Catalan language and culture commenced. The consequences of this repression were analysed by Josep Benet in a book with a highly explicit title: *L’intent franquista de genocidi cultural contra Catalunya* (Barcelona, 1995) (The Francoist attempt at cultural genocide against Catalonia). Almost a year before the war ended, the regions around Lleida and Tarragona began to feel the effects of the judicial and administrative machinery at the service of the new regime. Starting on Christmas Eve 1938, when the final offensive was launched, the whole of Catalonia came under this same system. During the long post-war period, which began in early February 1939, to the death toll caused by the most bloody form of repression were added the victims of the control to which all aspects of everyday life were subjected, and those of what has been termed ‘repression by contempt’, which is so difficult to pin down.

The small island of Minorca, which remained loyal to the Republic to the end, offers a highly enlightening example. There were a total of 150 deaths, mostly executions carried out in 1939. However, several recent studies show that this figure doubles if the deaths ascribable to the shortages suffered by the most needy in the course of the post-war recovery are taken into consideration.\(^25\)

Everywhere corruption and extortion, securely shielded by the coercive system itself, impeded the rebuilding of everyday life, while the dozens of prosecutions handled by the new government authorities or the ordinary courts of justice illustrate the vulnerable situation in which numerous marginal groups belonging to the popular classes remained for years.\(^26\)

Crimes against property rose to over 50% of the cases brought to trial in the civil courts – the figure considered usual in normal times –, a sign that the problem of survival was driving people to extremes. A significant number were reduced to stealing small but essential items, such as food, clothing, bicycles, electricity and professional tools of all kinds. These small lapses into minor delinquency were accompanied by offences to do with rationing, quotas and taxes to regulate the distribution of scarce products of basic necessity. Many of these cases associated with the exceptional circumstances of the period were handled by the ordinary courts or the civil governors. The same applied to the suicides attributed in the reports of the Civil Guard to “the fear of being judged”, complaints which dared to mention the purchase of guarantors’ signatures, and cases involving working prisoners who escaped or failed to carry out their sentences, all of which point to a few of the weak points the regime was unable to eliminate.

When investigating the actions of the judicial and governmental authorities, one also find clear cases in which sexual favours were obtained under coercion from women and girls with Republican pasts. This type of violence was more serious than the humiliating and exemplifying practices also inflicted on many men, such as swallowing castor oil or having their heads shaved; it also escaped the consequences of the control of social morality which was enforced with wholehearted cooperation from the Church. Attitudes towards certain forms of behaviour that came under the criminal code from 1944 onwards – including abortion, desertion of the family, infanticide, and other acts with obvious sexual connotations, such as indecent assault and rape – cast light on the way women, in questions of morality, became the main victims to be punished. The same double standard made it possible for illegal prostitution – closely associated with the hardship and poverty endured by so many women who had been left alone with no means of support in the difficult post-war years – to coexist alongside a legal, regulated form of prostitution, at least until 1956.

The regime set up organizations to protect the many women and girls who had been left alone by the war, notably the Patronato de Protección de la Mujer (Women’s Protection Board). However the efficacy of such organizations leaves room for doubt in view of the number of young maidservants tried for prostitution, loose-living or immoral practices also inflicted on many men, such as swallowing castor oil or having their heads shaved; it also escaped the consequences of the control of social morality which was enforced with wholehearted cooperation from the Church. Attitudes towards certain forms of behaviour that came under the criminal code from 1944 onwards – including abortion, desertion of the family, infanticide, and other acts with obvious sexual connotations, such as indecent assault and rape – cast light on the way women, in questions of morality, became the main victims to be punished. The same double standard made it possible for illegal prostitution – closely associated with the hardship and poverty endured by so many women who had been left alone with no means of support in the difficult post-war years – to coexist alongside a legal, regulated form of prostitution, at least until 1956.

The situation of women takes on especially dramatic overtones if one considers the fate of women prisoners. Ricard Vinyes, in *Irredentas. Las presas políticas y sus hijas en las cárcel franquistas* (Temas de Hoy, 2002),\(^27\) describes how many women were imprisoned along with their children. Many children were born in prison and subsequently offered in adoption. Other indirect victims of repression were the children placed in the care of institutions such as the Auxilio Social (Social Assistance), a prototypical institutionalized charity which consistently enjoyed the protection of National Catholicism. Orphans
and children whose parents were in prison were scattered about in special schools, centres and charitable institutions all over the country. Most of those in Barcelona were sent to the Asilo de Reforma Toribio Duran; those in Tarragona to the Casa Tutelar de San José; while in Lleida strange agricultural camps for children were set up, one of which was at Gimenells, near Lleida city.

Thus the construction of the new regime took place in a subjugated, terrorized country, where there was no room for political opposition of any kind because widespread poverty engendered submission. Ismael Saz and J.A. Gómez Roda, in their study *El Franquismo en Valencia. Formas de vida y actitudes sociales en la posguerra* (Episteme, 1999), illustrate this clearly and reflect on the relationship between consent and passivity. When all is said and done, the fact that people sometimes accepted minor sinecures from the government is best explained by the hardship suffered by the lower classes. Graft became part of the very foundations of the system: the regulation of the economy and the administration of public affairs helped irregularities to become the rule in questions related to survival under a regime in which the notion of compassion for the vanquished was non-existent.

Not until 1952, after two decades of autarchy and isolation, were ration cards abolished. In the following year Spain signed a military treaty with the United States and in 1955 it entered the United Nations. One year later, in 1956, the PCE launched its so-called Policy of National Reconciliation, under which it solemnly declared its readiness to put an end to the divisions created by the Civil War. Certainly many things had changed in the preceding twenty years, though for those on the losing side everyday life was still fraught with difficulties. Meanwhile the wounds inflicted by the war and the revolution, and deepened to an unusual degree by the regime’s repressive measures, remained unhealed, and this delayed the reconciliation which, though possible, had few opportunities to express itself.

Today the survivors and the relatives of those who disappeared as a result of Francoist repression – those described as rebels, bandits or simply murderers in the sentences handed down by a judicial system that was a farce – are still awaiting reparation, albeit in moral form. Others believe it may even be possible to recover their relatives’ remains and give them a decent burial. Restoring to the losers of the war the memory that was demonstrably stolen from them is both a necessary and an unquestionably complex process, though in fact it is merely a matter of acknowledging and making public the things that historians have been investigating, discovering and gathering into history books aimed at the academic community rather than the general public. Probably for this very reason many ordinary people have felt the desire in recent years to write down their experiences and testify to their own recollections. All these individual histories add their contribution to the efforts still required to gain a better understanding of the defeat and the suffering it caused.

### Notes and Bibliography

[1] Progress has recently been made in this direction: on 24 October 2007 the Catalan parliament passed the Llei del Memorial Democràtic (Law of Democratic Memorial) and a few days later, on 31 October 2007, the Spanish Congress of Deputies approved a bill “under which rights are acknowledged and extended and steps are taken in favour of those who suffered persecution and violence during the Civil War and the Dictatorship”. Both texts can be found at: <http://www10.gencat.net/drep/AppJava/cat/Memorial/index.jsp>


[3] In Catalonia, 8,500 people were liquidated in the Republican rearguard between 1936 and the beginning of 1939, only 400 of whom had undergone some form of trial, according to Josep M. Solé i Sabaté and Joan Villarroixa. *La repressió a la reaguarda de Catalunya, 1936-1939*. Publicacions de l’Abadia de Montserrat, Barcelona 1989. In the Valencian Country, Vicent Gavarda puts the figure at 4,715: *La represión en la retaguardia republicana del País Valenciano*, Edicions Alfons el Magnánim, Valencia 1996.


[5] J. A. Martín Palín gives the following definition in “La memoria del golpe militar de 1936” in *Claves de Razón Práctica*, No. 174, July-August 2007, pp. 42-45: “A bando militar (military decree) is an order issued by a general in command or military authority in the field or in a state of war against which no previous law can be invoked as being still in force”.

[6] We owe the first analysis to the doctoral thesis of Josep M. Solé i Sabaté. *La repressió franquista a Catalunya, 1938-1953*. Edicions 62, Barcelona 1985, which has recently been republished (September 2003) with minor revisions. Solé i Sabaté was also the editor of “La repressió franquista (1938-1977)”. ""
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[7] Certain local histories are of invaluable assistance in describing the repressive violence of those years. Examples are: J. March, A. Cerdà, P. Salas. Pol·lença. La guerra civil a Pol·lença. La revolta contra la rebel·lió. Edicions Documenta Balear, Col·lecció Guerra Civil a Mallorca, 2006, and, in the same series, the account mentioned in the text: Bartomeu Garí. Porreses. Desfilades de dia, afusellaments de nit, Majorca 2007.


[10] The association commenced its activities in the mid-1980s. Finally, in the spring of 2006, the sign-posting and ‘dignification’ of the area commenced at the instigation of Memorial Democràtic, an institution set up by the Generalitat de Catalunya, on the basis of a project entitled “Espais de la Batalla del Segre”, with coordination from the Servei d’Història, Documentació i Patrimoni of the History Department at the University of Lleida. This latter service has also produced a DVD, “Un camp de batalla de la guerra civil al front del Segre. El Merengue i la Lleva del Biberó (1938)”, as part of the series Llocs de memòria amb història. Universitat de Lleida, 2006.


[12] The data on Francoist repression are in Mercè Barallat. La represión a la postguerra civil a Lleida (1938-1945). Publicacions de l’Abadia de Montserrat, Barcelona 1991; those on the initial phases of the occupation are in Joan Sagués. Una ciutat en guerra. Lleida en la guerra civil espanyola, 1936-1939. Publicacions de l’Abadia de Montserrat, Barcelona 2003. The names of the victims are listed on the following web sites: “Morts de la guerra civil al cementiri d’Alpicat”, <http://www.alpicat.cat/historiaguerracivil/>, and “Morts de la guerra civil i la represión franquista a Lleida”, <http://webserveis5.udl.es/gcivil/>. Both were created as part of the Pilot Plan for the Lleida region, under the terms of a collaboration agreement with Memorial Democràtic de Catalunya (first phase 2005-06).


[14] On 24 November 2007 the press reported that a court of the Valencian Autonomous Community (the Sala del Contenció Administratiu of the Tribunal Superior de Justícia) had decided to accept an appeal from the Council against an earlier ruling in favour of the organization Fòrum per la Memòria Històrica del País Valencià, which had succeeded in halting the development work pending investigation of the remains in the cemetery extension. The court based its decision on the argument that Fòrum per la Memòria cannot represent the individual rights of the victims, since only direct relatives can do that. This ignores the fact that the majority of the relatives have left the area or do not know where their forebears were buried. See El País, 24 November 2007 and, for discussion on the topic: <http://www.foroporalmemoria.info/>.


There are believed to have been 2,500 casualties in the city of Barcelona alone. In the city of Lleida, Mercè Barallat has documented 253 of the total of over 300 victims of the bombing raid on 2 November 1937, of whom approximately fifty were children from the Liceu Escolar. Most of the 400 dead attributed to the 1938 bombardments have not been identified.

[18] The cataloguing is being carried out with technical coordination from the Arxiu Nacional de Catalunya and the support of the Programa per a la Memòria Democràtica. Only when the data base is complete will it be possible to locate proceedings corresponding to particular groups. This cannot be done at present because the charges against several people, which are very numerous, were filed under the first name in the list, and the only way of knowing the names of the other accused and where they were present because the charges against several people, which are very numerous, were filed under the first name in the list, and the only way of knowing the names of the other accused and where they were form is by examining each dossier.


[20] Situations such as those outlined here explain why the forecasts made by the Generalitat de Catalunya in 2000, when compensation to persons not covered by the Law of Amnesty 46/1977 (15 October 1977) was regulated, have proved totally insufficient. Instead of the anticipated 2,000 claims, 38,000 have been received to date, most of them from soldiers who were interned in concentration camps.


[22] The information has been taken from the first synthesis for the whole of Spain which was produced by F. Morente Valero. La escuela y el Estado Nuevo. La depuración del Magisterio Nacional, 1936-1943. Ámbito Ediciones, Valladolid 1997, p. 290. Studies of Catalan teachers who suffered reprisals include Josef González-Agápite; Salomó Marquès. La repressió del professorat a Catalunya sota el franquisme, 1939-1943. Institut d’Estudis Catalans, Barcelona 1996. With regard to higher education, we referred to Jaume Claret. El atroz desmoche. La destrucción de la universidad española por el franquismo, 1936-1945. Crítica, Barcelona 2006.


[25] The data come from J. Martín Jiménez. Aportaciones a la historia de la guerra civil en Menorca. Ediones Nura, Minorca 2000, 2 volumes; the source
used by this author was Deseado Mercadal Bagur. *La guerra civil en Menorca, 1936-1939. Relato histórico de un testigo.* Maó 1994.


[27] The author acted as adviser to the documentary *Els nens perduts del franquisme* (The lost children of the Franco regime) by Montse Armengou and Ricard Bells, 2002, Televisió de Catalunya, one of the most successful television documentaries in terms of viewer ratings.

**About the Author**

Conxita Mir Curcó (Lleida, 1952) is a professor of contemporary history at the University of Lleida. She began her research career in the field of electoral sociology as co-author, alongside Professors Albert Balcells and J.B. Culla, of the book *Les eleccions generals a Catalunya de 1901 a 1923,* (Fundació Jaume Bofill, Barcelona, 1982). She is the author of *Caciquisme polític i lluita electoral: Lleida 1890-1923,* (Publicacions de l’Abadia de Montserrat, Barcelona, 1985) and was the editor of *Actituds Polítiques i control social a la Catalunya de la Restauració (1875-1923),* (Lleida, 1989).

Since then she has worked on political violence and repression under the Franco regime. Her publications include *Repressió econòmica i franquisme: l’actuació del Tribunal de Responsabilitats Polítiques a la província de Lleida,* with Fabià Corretgé, Judit Farré and Joan Sagués (Publicacions de l’Abadia de Montserrat, 1997) and *Vivir es sobrevivir. Justicia, orden y marginación en la Catalunya rural de posguerra (1939-1951),* (Milenio, Lleida, 2000). She also contributed to the collective work edited by Julián Casanova *Morir, matar, sobrevivir. La violencia en la dictadura de Franco,* (Crítica, Barcelona, 2002). She herself has acted as editor of various collective works, the latest of which is *Jóvenes y dictaduras de entremedias. Propaganda, doctrina y encuadramiento: Italia, Alemania, Japón, Portugal y España,* Editorial Mileni (Lleida, 2007).

She is a member of the Institut d’Estudis Catalans and has served on the board of the Asociación Española de Historia Contemporánea, among other bodies. She was a member of the Comissió Assessora per a la creació del Memorial Democràtic (2005) and of the scientific committee that provided evaluation and advice regarding the draft bill on the localization and identification of persons who disappeared during the Civil War and the Franco regime (2007). She is currently on the editorial board of the journals *L’Avenç* and *Segle XX. Revista Catalana d’Història,* and on the advisory board of *Historia Social, Pasado y Memoria. Revista de historia Contemporánea, Historia del Presente,* and *Alcores. Revista de Historia Contemporánea.*